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COMMENTS
Effective Representation and Multimemher Districts
I.

INTRODUCTION

Although most state legislative districts are "single-member"
districts drawn to provide for the election of one representative by
voters within a defined geographical area,1 many states have established "multimember" districts in which voters elect two or more
legislators from a single constituency.2 In recent years, members of
various minority interest groups, most typically, residents of urban
Negro ghettos, have brought actions contending that multimember
districting deprives them of equal protection of the laws in violation
of the fourteenth amendment. 8 These challenges to multimemberI. While the majority of state legislative districts in 1955 were of the single-member
variety, only nine states were apportioned completely into single-member districts, and
thus 12% of the nation's state senators and 45% of its state representatives were elected
in multimember districts. Klain, A New Look at the Constituencies: The Need for a
Recount and a Reappraisal, 49 AM. POL. Ser. R.Ev. 1105, 1106-11 (1955). These findings
were substantially confirmed in 1962 by P. DAVID &: R. EISENBERG, STATE LEGISLATIVE
REDISTRICTING: MAJOR lssUES IN THE WAKE OF JUDICIAL DECISION 20 (1962) [hereinafter
DAVID&: EISENBERG]. David and Eisenberg found that 3,179 legislators were elected from
3,179 single-member districts across the nation, while 2,704 state legislators were
elected from 927 multimember districts. Most of the multimember districts were house
rather than senate districts. There have been no thorough studies showing the status
of multimember districts since the major reapportionment cases of the early l960's,
but there seems to be a general trend away from their use: Maryland, Michigan, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee have eliininated multimember districts completely. See R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND
PoLmcs 504 (1968) [hereinafter DIXON].
2. The following states, among others, have some large multimember districts. In
Arkansas, thirteen legislators are elected from one district, five legislators are elected
from each of two districts, four legislators are elected from each of three districts, and
three legislators are elected from each of six districts. Yancey v. Faubus, 251 F. Supp.
998, 1003-04 (E.D. Ark. 1965). In Georgia, seven legislators are elected from one multimember district and three legislators are elected from each of two districts. Dorsey v.
Fortson, 228 F. Supp. 259, 262 (N.D. Ga. 1964). In Texas, fourteen legislators are
elected from the multimember district of Dallas County, ten legislators are elected
from Bexar County, and eight legislators are elected from Tarrant County: three
districts elect two representatives each, two districts elect six representatives each, and
other districts elect seven, five, four, and three representatives respectively. Kilgarlin
v. Martin, 252 F. Supp. 404, 454-58 (S.D. Tex. 1966). In Mississippi, ten state representatives and five senators are elected from one district, five representatives are elected
from each of two other districts, and seven legislators are elected from another district.
Connor v. Johnson, 265 F. Supp. 492, 495-96 (S.D. Miss. 1967). In Wyoming, ten legislators are elected from one district, and four legislators are elected from each of two
others. Schaefer v. Thomson, 251 F. Supp. 450, 452 (D. Wyo. 1965). In Nevada, forty
assemblymen are elected from sixteen districs and twenty senators from thirteen districts. Dungan v. Sawyer, 253 F. Supp. 352, 357 (D. Nev. 1966). For a general discussion
of the multimember district and its effects, see Silva, Compared Values of the Singleand Multi-Member Legislative District, 17 WESTERN PoL. Q. 504 (1964); Hamilton,
Legislative Constituencies: Single-Member Districts, Multi-Member Districts, and
Floterial Districts, 20 WESTERN PoL. Q. 321 (1967); DIXON, supra note 1, at 504-15.
3. See, e.g., Kilgarlin v. Martin, 252 F. Supp. 404 (S.D. Tex. 1966), revd. on other
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districting schemes have been based on the argument that the concept
of equal protection incorporates more than the mere notion that state
legislative districts must be apportioned so that each elected official
represents a substantially equal number of persons voting; 4 plaintiffs have claimed that the equal protection clause also guarantees a
voter's right to "effective representation"-a concept of broader
scope than mere mathematical equality among districts. 5 It is this
right to effective representation which is allegedly infringed by the
multimember districts.
The minority interest-group members who have challenged the
validity of multimember districts have argued that since such districts
have large populations, their groups become submerged in constituencies which are dominated politically by more powerful groups
than their own, and which groups also espouse interests differing
significantly from their own. Thus, the minority interest-group
members have claimed that multimember districts have diluted
their voting power and have precluded them from electing substantially the same number of representatives that they would have
been able to elect had the multimember districts been apportioned
into single-member districts. The above argument concludes that
this inability on the part of minority groups to elect a number of
grounds sub nom. Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967); Sims v. Baggett, 247 F. Supp.
96 (M.D. Ala. 1965); Mann v. Davis, 245 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. Va.), afjd. sub nom.
Burnette v. Davis, 382 U.S. 42 (1965); Schaefer v. Thompson, 251 F. Supp. 450 (D. Wyo.
1965), afjd. sub nom. Harrison v. Schaefer, 383 U.S. 269 (1966); Drew v. Scranton, 229
F. Supp. 310 (M.D. Pa.), vacated and remanded, 379 U.S. 40 (1964); Rockefeller v.
Smith, 246 Ark. 794, 440 S.W.2d 580 (1969); Silver v. Brown, 64 Cal. 2d 3, 409 P .2d
689, 48 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1966); Kruidenier v. McCulloch, 258 Iowa 1121, 142 N.W.2d
355 (1966); Butcher v. Bloom, 415 Pa. 438, 203 A.2d 556 (1964); Hainsworth v. Martin,
386 S.W.2d 202 (Tex.), vacated and remanded, 382 U.S. 109 (1965).
The Supreme Court has dealt with the issue of multimember districting in Fortson
v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965), and Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966), and plaintiffs in many of the subsequent challenges to that form of districting have relied on
the Court's decisions in those two cases even though the plaintiffs in Fortson and Bums
were not granted relief.
4. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377
U.S. 633 (1964); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Maryland
Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S.
678 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967);
Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
The one man-one vote standard was made applicable to local governmental units in
Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968). See also Hadley v. Junior College Dist.,
397 U.S. 50 (1970).
5. The Supreme Court stated in Reynolds v. Sims that " ••• the achieving of fair
and effective representation for all citizens is concededly the basic aim of legislative
apportionment ••••" 377 U.S. at 565-66.
The Court had earlier held in Wesberry v. Sanders that under art. 1, § 2, of
the Constitution one man's vote must be as nearly as practicable of the same value
as another's in a congressional election. Justice Black, in his opinion for the Court,
stated that the objective of the Constitution is to make "equal representation for equal
numbers of people the fundamental goal ••••" 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964).
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representatives substantially proportionate to their numbers amounts
to a denial of effective representation in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In order to remedy this
alleged constitutional infirmity, the groups have sought reapportionment of the multimember districts into smaller, more homogeneous
single-member districts.
This argument based on the concept of effective representation
rests primarily upon language contained in the Supreme Court's
opinion in Fortson v. Dorsey. 6 In that case, the Court declined to
grant relief to residents of a multimember district in Georgia who
claimed that they had been denied effective representation. However, the majority opinion indicated in dictum that the effective representation issue was not foreclosed from judicial inquiry simply by
virtue of a district's compliance with the one man-one vote standards
set forth in the reapportionment cases.7 The Court, in a paragraph
that seems to invite challenges to multimember schemes, stated:
It might well be that, designedly or otherwise, a multi-member
constituency apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of a
particular case, would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population. When this is demonstrated it will be time enough to consider
whether the system still passes constitutional muster.8
In Burns v. Richardson,9 decided one year after Fortson, the Su6. 379 U.S. 433 (1965). Fortson was the first case before the Supreme Court which
involved a challenge under the equal protection clause to the validity of a multimemberdistricting scheme. Under Georgia's 1962 Senatorial Reapportionment Act, the state was
divided into state senatorial districts which plaintiffs conceded were substantially equal
in population. Throughout most of the state, from one to eight counties comprised a
senatorial district and the voters elected the senator for that district on a district-wide
basis. However, the seven most populous counties were each divided into anyivhere
from two to seven districts, and the voters in each of those counties elected at large
the number of senators equal to the number of districts in the county. The plaintiffs
in Fortson brought suit seeking a decree that the county-wide voting scheme in each of
the multidistrict counties violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. A three-judge district court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and held that the use of both single-member and multimember districts resulted
in an invidious discrimination against the residents of the multidistrict counties.
Dorsey v. Fortson, 228 F. Supp. 259, 263 (N.D. Ga. 1964). In reversing the district court's
decision the Supreme Court held that a multimember district did not constitute a
per se violation of the equal protection clause. The Court pointed out:
Agreeing with appellees' contention that the multi-member constituency feature
of the Georgia scheme was per se bad, the District Court entered the decree on
summary judgment. ·we treat the question as presented in that context, and our
opinion is not to be understood to say that in all instances or under all circumstances such a system as Georgia has will comport with the dictates of the Equal
Protection Clause.
379 U.S. at 439. For an interesting commentary on the apparently inept manner in
which plaintiffs' counsel handled the appeal before the Supreme Court, see DIXON,
supra note 1, at 476-78.
7. 379 U.S. at 439.
8. 379 U.S. at 439.
9, 384 U.S. 73 (1966).
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preme Court reaffirmed its position that, despite compliance with
the equal-population test of Reynolds v. Sims, 10 apportionment
schemes which minimize or cancel out the voting strength of a racial
or political element may invidiously discriminate against the members of that element in violation of their right to equal protection.11
The Supreme Court has not decided a case involving an assertion
of the claim that a multimember district denies the right of effective
representation since Fortson and Burns. However, there have been
several subsequent challenges in lower courts to the validity of such
districts, and these challenges have generally failed because the
factual evidence did not demonstrate conclusively that the voting
strength of a legally cognizable racial or political element had been
minimized or cancelled.12 In Chavis v. Whitcomb, 13 however, a three10. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
11. Where the requirements of Reynolds v. Sims are met, apportionment schemes
including multimember districts will constitute an invidious discrimination only if
it can be shown that "designedly or otherwise, a multimember constituency apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of a particular case, would operate to
minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the
voting population."
384 U.S. at 88.
12. See K.ilgarlin v. Martin, 252 F. Supp. 404 (S.D. Tex. 1966), revd. on other
grounds sub nom. K.ilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967); Mann v. Davis, 245 F. Supp.
241 (E.D. Va.), afjd. sub nom. Burnette v. Davis, 382 U.S. 42 (1965); Schaefer v. Thomson, 251 F. Supp. 450 (D. Wyo. 1965), a/fd. sub nom. Harrison v. Schaefer, 383 U.S.
269 (1966); and Silver v. Brown, 64 Cal. 2d 3, 409 P.2d 689, 48 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1966).
In two cases relief was granted and the state was forced to subdistrict multimember
districts. In Kruidenier v. McCulloch, 258 Iowa 1121, 142 N.W.2d 355 (1966), the Iowa
supreme court voided a mixed system of single- and multimember districts on the
ground that a resident of a multimember district possesses greater voting power than a
resident of a single-member district because he is represented by more legislators. The
court stated: "The Equal Protection Clause is violated if certain constituents are given
an unequal number of representatives." 258 Iowa at 1155-56, 142 N.W.2d at 375. Although the plaintiff offered proof showing a minimization of interest-group voting
strength, the court did not consider that element of the case in reaching its decision.
Thus, the Fortson dictum was not the basis for the court's order that the entire state
be redistricted into single-member districts.
In Sims v. Baggett, 247 F. Supp. 96 (M.D. Ala. 1965), a legislative plan grouped three
counties together into a multimember district from which three representatives were
elected. Another district, which was made up of four counties, had three representatives.
The court found no geometric, geographic, or equalization basis for the districting
scheme. 247 F. Supp. at 107-08. It ordered the multimember districts to be subdistricted
but, as in Kruidenier, did not rely on the Fortson dictum. Rather, the court reasoned
that, in light of the
pattern and practice of discrimination in Alabama as a backdrop, the cavalier
treatment accorded predominantly Negro counties in the House plan takes on added
meaning. The Court is permitted to find the intent of the Legislature from con•
sistency of inherent probabilities inferred from the record as a whole. We, therefore,
hold that the Legislature intentionally aggregated predominantly Negro counties
with predominantly white counties for the sole purpose of preventing the election
of Negroes to House membership.
247 F. Supp. at 109. The court had placed this "intent" within a constitutional framework:
Any limitation of the persons for whom votes may be cast is logically a restriction
on the right to vote. Political parties are not mentioned in the Constitution, but
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judge federal district court14 in Indiana found that the plaintiff had
presented sufficient factual evidence to sustain his claim, and therefore held that the multimember district under attack in that case denied the plaintiff his right to effective representation in violation of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Thus, by
bringing the issue of effective representation squarely into the judicial arena, the Chavis court took another step into the "political
thicket" 15 of extending the scope of judicial review over state legislative apportionment schemes. This Comment will analyze the
soundness of that step. It is first necessary, however, to examine in
greater detail the facts and holding in Chavis.
II.

THE CHAVIS CASE

The plaintiffs in Chavis challenged the constitutionality of a
multimember district consisting of Marion County16 from which
eight state senators and fifteen state representatives were elected at
large.17 One of the plaintiffs in Chavis was a Negro resident of
the abridgement of voting rights on account of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude is forbidden by the Fifteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court has
long recognized that the Fifteenth and the more inclusive Fourteenth Amendments
were adopted with the special intent of protecting Negroes and their voting
rights .••• We conclude that the Constitution itself requires a distinction between
the familiar political abuse of gerrymandering and gerrymandering for the purpose
of racial discrimination.
247 F. Supp. at 105. Thus, Sims also turned on grounds independent of the Fortson
dictum.
In a recent Arkansas case, Rockefeller v. Smith, 246 Ark. 794, 440 S.W.2d 580 (1969),
the plaintiffs alleged representational disparities between single• and multimember
districts. The plaintiffs offered evidence which showed that identifiable interest groups
were submerged into a large multimember district which elected thirteen legislators.
The state supreme court reversed, on jurisdictional grounds, a county court's order
granting relief.
l!I. 305 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D. Ind.), redistricting order per curiam, 307 F. Supp. 1362
(S.D. Ind. 1969), prob. juris. noted, 397 U.S. 984 (1970). The state had appealed the
court's decision on the merits, and had appealed separately the subsequent redistrict•
ing order. Probable jurisdiction was noted in both cases on March 16, 1970. 397 U.S.
979 (1970). However, on March 23, 1970, that order was revoked, the cases were con•
solidated into one appeal, and probable jurisdiction was noted. 397 U.S. 984 (1970).
See note Ill infra.
14. For a discussion of the procedural aspects of the case, see note 17 infra.
15. This phrase was first used by Justice Frankfurter in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S.
549, 556 (1946).
16. Marion County includes the city of Indianapolis and comprises the Twenty-Sixth
District of the Indiana House and Nineteenth District of the Indiana Senate. 305 F.
Supp. at 1366.
17. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964), the suit was tried before a three-judge
court in the Southern District of Indiana, since the complaint prayed that the statute
establishing the multimember district, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 34-102, 34-104 (Burns Supp.
1968), be declared violative of the United States Constitution. The court stated that
"[t]he complaint seeks declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.5.C. § 2201 and injunctive
relief would necessarily accompany a judgment adverse to defendants." 305 F. Supp. at
1!166. The action was originally commenced against the Indiana General Assembly and
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Marion County. Significantly, he did not claim that there were
deviations in population among Indiana's legislative districts which
violated the one man-one vote principle of Reynolds v. Sims; nor did
he claim that the state had engaged in overt racial gerrymandering.
Rather, the plaintiff relied solely on the claim that the Marion
County multimember district diluted the voting strength of the
its individual members; later the court granted the plaintiffs' motion to join Governor
Edgar D. Whitcomb as a defendant. By further order of May 12, 1969, the district
court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss as against the Indiana General As·
sembly and its individual members. 305 F. Supp. at 1366.
Although the court ruled that the claim was not properly a class action, it did permit
plaintiffs to maintain the action individually. See the separate order of June 18, 1969,
305 F. Supp. 1359, 1363 (S.D. Ind. 1969). By an order on the same date, the court granted
the petition of certain intervening defendants for leave to intervene nunc pro tune
June 12, 1969, pursuant to FED. R. C1v. P. 24(b)(2). Plaintiffs a_lleged that the state
statutes which established the Marion County state house and senate district operated
to violate their rights under the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. Jurisdiction was predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964).
When the case finally went to trial, numerous plaintiffs sued in their own behalf and
in behalf of persons similarly situated. Plaintiff Chavis is an Indiana resident living
outside the Center Township Ghetto area. He alleged that he had an active interest
in protecting the voting rights of the inhabitants of the Ghetto area whose interests and
voting propensities approximated his own. However, the court ruled that he was not
entitled to relief since he was not a resident or voter in the Center Township Ghetto.
305 F. Supp. at 1390.
Plaintiffs Ramsey and Bryant alleged that they were part of a cognizable interest
group which regularly engaged in bloc voting and which was cancelled out by the
voting of more powerful interest groups with contrary interests in Marion County.
Plaintiff Bryant was granted relief, but plaintiff Ramsey was denied relief since he was
not a resident of the Center Township Ghetto as defined by the court. 305 F. Supp. at
1390-91.
Plaintiff Hotz, a white resident of Marion County outside Indianapolis, alleged that
suburban Republicans were "deprived of a proportionate voice as to who their Republican state legislators shall be, in years of Republican victory in Marion County."
305 F. Supp at 1367. The court ruled that her complaint was "directed to intraparty
organization and selection of candidates and does not • • • rise to the degree of a constitutional deprivation of equal protection by reason of the statutes here under attack."
305 F. Supp. at 1389.
Plaintiff Rowland claimed that he was frustrated in his efforts to cast his vote
intelligently by reason of the length of the ballot relating to candidates for the General Assembly in the multimember district. The court denied relief, ruling that the
factor of lengthy ballots alone was "not sufficient to justify a declaration of the unconstitutionality of multi-member districting." 305 F. Supp. at 1389-90.
Plaintiff Walker appeared before the court in the dual status of a Negro voter
residing in Lake County (which includes Gary and Hammond) and of an Indiana voter
residing outside Marion County. He failed to obtain relief as a Lake County Negro
since he did not show "that Lake County Negroes are a racial minority group which
has been deprived of representation so as to distinguish them from other Lake County
resident voters." 305 F. Supp. at 1390. Walker alleged that since he voted for fewer
legislators than did Marion County residents, he therefore had fewer legislators to
represent him in the state legislature. The court refused to grant him relief on this
allegation and held that "in the absence of stronger evidence of dilution, his remedy
is limited to the consideration which should be given to the uniform-districting principle in any subsequent reapportionment of the Indiana General Assembly." 305 F.
Supp. at 1390.
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ghetto residents within that district and thus abridged their right
of effective representation as enunciated in Fortson. 18
In order to demonstrate a denial of effective representation, the
plaintiff in Chavis introduced extensive data which demonstrated
that there existed within Marion County a "Center Township
Ghetto" area. 19 Additional data showed that the residents of that
area were clearly distinguishable from the residents of the remainder
of the county in terms of salaries, housing, educational level, welfare
status, and unemployment rate. 20 The plaintiff also established that
the residents of the Ghetto were predominantly Negroes, and hence
that they constituted a racially homogeneous group. 21 On the basis
of this social and economic data, the plaintiff alleged, and the court
found, that because of their distinctive minority characteristics, the
Negro residents of the Ghetto had interests in areas of substantive
law-such as housing regulations, welfare programs, garnishment
statutes, and unemployment compensation-which diverged sharply
from the interests of nonresidents of the Ghetto.22 Thus, the court
found that the Negro residents of the Center Township Ghetto were
an identifiable element of the voting population within the Marion
County multimember district. 23
18. See text accompanying notes 6-9 supra.
19. After referring to dictionary definitions, pertinent demographic determinants,
and the REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 6 n.l (1968),
the court adopted the following definition of the word "ghetto" for the Chavis case:
Ghetto-A primarily residential section of an urban area characterized by a higher
relative density of population and higher relative proportion of substandard housing than in the overall metropolitan area which is inhabited predominantly by
members of a racial, ethnic, or other minority group, most of whom are of lower
socioeconomic status than the prevailing status in the metropolitan area and whose
residence in the section is often the result of social, legal, or economic restrictions
or custom.
305 F. Supp. at 1373. The Center Township Ghetto consists of certain census tracts of
land and their subdivsions within the city of Indianapolis in Marion County, 305 F.
Supp. at 1380-81. As the court stated: "This does not represent the entire ghettoized
portion of Center Township but only the portion which is predominantly inhabited by
Negroes and which was alleged in the complaint." 305 F. Supp. at 1380-81. The approximate 1967 population of Center Township was 132,000 of which approximately
35,000 were white and 97,000 were nonwhite. Approximately 99.8% of the nonwhite
population was Negro. 305 F. Supp. at 1380 n.ll.
20. The court employed exhibits offered by both parties. Selected census tracts which
were chosen for comparison included one relatively wealthy suburban area, three areas
which were disputably within the Ghetto area as alleged by the complaint, six tracts
within the Ghetto areas as referred to in the complaint, and one tract randomly chosen
to typify a white ghetto portion not mentioned in the complaint. Eight tables were
used comparing the different tracts with regard to housing, social, economic, and critical
differentiating characteristics. Critical differentiating characteristics included owneroccupied dwelling units, deteriorated and dilapidated housing conditions, old-age assistance recipients, high school graduates, juvenile delinquency cases, unemployment rate,
income, and automobile ownership. 305 F. Supp. at 1372-81.
21. 305 F. Supp. at 1381.
22, 305 F. Supp. at 1386.
23. 305 F. Supp. at 1386.
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After demonstrating that the Negro Ghetto residents were an
identifiable element, the plaintiff introduced evidence which demonstrated that the votes of these residents were minimized by the multimember-districting scheme. In past elections, the slate of candidates
offered by one party generally captured all of the Marion County
district's legislative seats.24 Since much of Marion County was a
predominantly white suburban area, 25 both major parties generally
offered candidates who catered to the views of the white majority,26
and thus, the differing views of the Negro residents of the Center
Township Ghetto were effectively unrepresented. Proof of inadequate Negro representation on party slates was evidenced by the
fact that, from 1960 to 1966, while the residents of the Ghetto accounted for 17 .81 per cent of the total population of the county,
only 4.75 per cent of the senators and 5.97 per cent of the representatives resided in the Ghetto. 27 Furthermore, by controlling the nominating machinery, the political parties were able to exert considerable influence over the actions of the legislators after they were
elected28-if a legislator's views consistently diverged from the party
line, he normally was not nominated for re-election. Because a party's
slate of candidates could succeed only by seeking to obtain the votes
of the white majority, the court found that "a legislator elected from
Marion County is hesitant to express the interests of the residents
of the Center Township Ghetto unequivocally in the legislative
chambers, even though he may believe it proper that those interests
be furthered.'' 29 Finally, the court determined that the population
of the Center Township Ghetto "is sufficient in size to elect approximately two members of the House of Representatives and approximately one senator if these were specific single-member legislative
districts within Marion County.''30 Viewing all of these factors to24. The district court stated that "since 1920 only slightly more than 1% of the
General Assembly candidates from Marion County have been elected from the political
party which did not generally prevail." 305 F. Supp. at 1385. For party statistics in this
regard, specifically dealing with Marion County, see Hamilton, supra note 2, at 324.
Silva, Relation of Representation and the Party System to the Number of Seats
Apportioned to a Legislative District, 17 WESTERN PoL. Q. 742, 769 (1964), states that
"the more members per district, the greater the disproportion between each party's
share of the statewide vote and its share of seats in the chamber." Many monographic
studies of state and metropolitan areas have demonstrated the validity of this generalization. See, e.g., Waltzer, Apportionment and Districting in Ohio: Components of
Deadlock, and Lamb, Michigan Legislative Apportionment, in THE PoLmcs OF REAPPORTIONMENT 173, 267 (M. Jewell ed. 1962); M. COLLINS, M. DAUER, P. DAVID, A. I.ACY,
&: G. MAUER, EVOLVING ISSUES AND PA'ITERNS OF STATE LEGISLATIVE R.EDISTRIC11NG IN LlRGE
MEmoPOLITAN AREAS (1966); DIXON, supra note 1, at 506-07.
25. 305 F. Supp. at 1386.
26. 305 F. Supp. at 1386.
27. 305 F. Supp. at 1384.
28. 305 F. Supp. at 1386.
29. 305 F. Supp. at 1386.
30. 305 F. Supp. at 1385.
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gether, the court concluded that the Marion County multimember
district minimized the votes of the Negro residents of the Center
Township Ghetto area. On the basis of its finding that the Negro
residents of the Center Township Ghetto were an identifiable element, and its finding that the multimember-districting scheme minimized the votes of these residents, the court held that the plaintiff
had been invidiously discriminated against in violation of his right
to effective representation implicit in the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment.81

III. THE

MULTIMEMBER DISTRICT:

A

POLITICAL AND

LEGAL .ANALYSIS

In order to assess the impact of the Chavis case, it is first necessary to analyze in greater detail the concept of effective representation that underlies the Fortson-Chavis rationale, and to consider how
a multimember district may offend that concept. Finally, it must be
determined whether the right to effective representation warrants
the constitutional protection that the Chavis case extends to it.

A. Interest Groups and Effective Representation
The most significant aspect of the Chavis opinion is its recognition that ensuring the equal population of legislative districts does not necessarily ensure that all the voters in those districts
are equally represented. Most courts have felt that the demands of
equal representation are satisfied if state legislative districts are apportioned so that a substantially equal number of voters reside in the
various districts within the state.32 But voters are not fungible 33they have diverse interests. Since governmental policy can either
impede or further those interests, voters with inconsistent interests
tend to differ over who should determine that policy. If an individual's interests substantially conflict with those of a majority of the
voters in a legislative district, the candidate of his choice will probably not be elected.34 Thus, as a matter of political reality, the
31. 305 F. Supp. at 1385-86.
32. See cases discussed in note 12 supra, as indicative of the courts' unwillingness to
become involved with the intricate concepts of representation. See also the discussion at
note 45 infra of the courts' treatment of alleged political gerrymandering.
33. The distinctive thing about people, in contrast to trees or acres, is that the
people are not fungible. Failure to perceive this leads to the "identity of interest"
fallacy which underlies such simple arithmetic measures as the electoral percentage
••• and which is the central fallacy of a rigid, simplistic "one man-one vote" theory.
Although legislators are elected "by voters," as Chief Justice Warren said, they are
ele~ted by voters who have interests which lead them to organize for group political
acuon.
DIXON, supra note 1, at 272.
34. Of course, factors such as the personal attributes of a particular candidate and
a lack of awareness of the candidates' positions on the part of the electorate will occasionally upset the operation of this model.
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strength of an individual vote is dependent upon the voting strength
of the interest group or groups to which that vote is connected.
Effective representation as a political concept, therefore, should be
defined in terms of the voting strength of interest groups.ms
Multimember districting is particularly conducive to the dilution
35. See, Dixon, Reapportionment in the Supreme Court and Congress: Constitutional Struggle for Fair Representation, 63 MICH. L REv. 209, 218 (1964):
[I]n apportionment cases the personal civil right of the voter is intertwined with
large, overriding questions concerning representation-i.e. concerning political
philosophies and practices of representation in a dynamically democratic public
order, in which groups are as relevant as individuals. Indeed, groups and parties are
the building blocks of political power. Because apportionment involves the creation
and control of political power, the group dynamics of American politics cannot be
ignored forever in reapportioning legislatures.
Professor Dixon has continually advanced the theme that fair representation is not
achieved through mere compliance with one man-one vote standards. The most recent
statement of this thesis is found in DIXON, supra note 1, at 17: "in reapportionment
cases more is involved than the self-centered constitutional right of a voter to cast a
vote which, at least in mathematical, nonfunctional terms, is weighted equally with
votes of others throughout the districts • • • ." In Professor Dixon's view, this "more"
constitutes fair representation and is comprised of several components, at least some
of which "are as amenable to judicial review as the equal protection standard." Id.
The book in its thorough history of the reapportionment revolution brings the theme
of effective representation into continual focus.
The importance of the group in determining the strength of the votes of individuals
who are members of that group was referred to in the original reapportionment cases by
both Justices Harlan and Stewart. Justice Harlan pointed out in his dissent in Reynolds
v. Sims that:
[It is] obvious, and, in the context of elections, more meaningful to note that people
are not ciphers and that legislators can represent their electors only by speaking for
their interests-economic, social, political-many of which do reflect the place
where electors live.
377 U.S. at 623-24. Justice Stewart would have applied to reapportionment cases an
equal protection standard which keyed on whether a certain state reapportionment
scheme preserved effective majority rule and whether any rational basis was present in
the classifications of constituencies comprising that scheme. 377 U.S. at 751. In support
of this standard, Justice Stewart argued:
Representative government is a process of accommodating group interests
through democratic institutional arrangements. Its function is to channel the
numerous opinions, interests, and abilities of the people of a State into the making
of the State's public policy. Appropriate legislative apportionment, therefore,
should ideally be designed to insure effective representation in the State's legislature, in cooperation with other organs of political power, of the various groups
and interests making up the electorate. In practice, of course this idea is approximated in the particular apportionment system of any state by a realistic accommodation of the diverse and often conflicting political forces operating within the
State.
377 U.S. at 749. Justice Harlan pointed out the importance of group power in order
to bolster his argument that the difficult determination of what interests are to be
represented should be left exclusively with the legislature. Justice Stewart pointed to
the importance of interest groups since he believed that all questions of apportionment
could not be solved at the threshold by merely inquiring into whether each district has
the same number of inhabitants. For an elaboration of the pluralistic nature of
American politics, see R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 145-46 (1956):
A. DEGRAZIA, PUBLIC AND REPUBLIC: POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN AMERICA (1951); and
Friedmann, The Changing Content of Public Interest: Some Comments on Harold D.
Lasswell, in NOMOS V: THE PUBLIC !NTEREsr 84 (C. Friedrich ed. 1962). Friedmann
states that "one of the outstanding • • • problems of contemporary industrialized
society, and most particularly in the United States, is the position of group interests
between the state and the individual." Id. See notes 66-71 infra and accompanying text.
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of interest group voting strength because a greater number of voters
must be members of an interest group in order for that group to
control election results in a multimember district than would be
necessary to gain this control in a single-member district.36 Illustratively, if a single-member district in a state is composed of one
hundred voters, an interest group consisting of fifty-one members
will effectively control election results. If the state decides to combine two single-member districts and create a multimember district
36. See generally note 2 supra. David and Eisenberg disapprove of the
generalizations in existing publications in regard to what wiII happen under one
districting plan rather than another, generalizations usually based on what is
referred to as "common knowledge," are generalizations that do not rest at all on
any adequately comprehensive view of recent state experience.
DAVID &: EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 21. See also, Silva, supra note 2, at 508-09. However, while generalizations are often inaccurate, especially those concerning the causeand-effect relationship between a particular districting scheme and its representational
effectiveness, it is still worthwhile to note the supposed advantages and disadvantages
of single- and multimember districts. Professor Dixon summarizes nine attributes of
single-member districts. He attributes five of these attributes-localism, less qualified
candidates, weak and decentralized parties, emphasis on candidates rather than parties
and issues, and legislative responsibility to the constituency involving some independence
from the party-to the small size of the district rather than to the fact that only one
legislator is elected from a single-member district. Multimember districts, on the other
hand, are likely to have less localism, more qualified candidates, more emphasis on
parties rather than individuals, and stronger and more dominant party apparatus.
As Professor Dixon points out, any defects resulting from the small size of singlemember districts could be disposed of by having smaller legislatures and larger singlemember districts. DIXON, supra note 1, at 504-05. But cf. note 74 infra and accompanying text.
Dixon cites other attributes of the single-member district which relate to its essential character. First, legislators elected from single-member districts are likely to have
shorter tenures of office. But see Silva, supra note 2, at 513. Second, he states that singlemember districts are more conducive to gerrymandering than are multimember districts. Third, single-member districts lead to the maintenance of a two-party rather
than a multiparty system. This tendency may relate not only to the single-member
district, but more fundamentally to the kind of electoral system employed. DIXON,
supra note 1, at 505.
While it is the thesis of this Comment that large multimember districts may lead
to underrepresentation of significant minority interests, it must be emphasized that
multimember districts are not inherently evil and that many commentators argue that
they should not be completely discarded. David and Eisenberg suggest that small multimember districts are not as likely to involve the problem of minimization as large
multimember districts, and that small multimember districts may indeed offer certain
advantages over single-member districts. The case for the single-member district, they
contend, while apparently ignoring urban ghettos such as the one involved in Chavis,
is weakest in metropolitan areas where communities of interests are likely to be broad.
Oppressive gerrymandering is less feasible in small multimember districts and will be
avoided if the parties are sufficiently competitive so that they can divide the delegation.
David and Eisenberg thus urge that in a county with a population between one-half and
one million people, a few small multimember districts would be preferable to many
single-member districts. DAVID &: EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 22.
Although they believe that any district whose residents elect four or five members at
large should normally be divided into small units, David and Eisenberg see no harm in
continuing the policies of many states in which two- or three-member districts are
widely used. Id. Obviously, however, the Marion County monolithic district in the
Chavis case, with its fifteen representatives and eight senators elected at large, is far
beyond the size limits for multimember districts envisioned by these authors.
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whose residents elect two representatives, that district would embrace
approximately two hundred voters. The fifty-one-member interest
group would thus be reduced to a minority group which would be
unable to elect any representatives merely on the strength of its fiftyone votes.87 The plaintiffs in Chavis, for example, proved that
Marion County legislators consistently resided in suburban, predominantly white, Washington Township in numbers "far disproportionate to Washington Township's percentage of the population."38
The Center Township Ghetto had a twenty-two per cent larger population than did Washington Township, but was the residence of only
approximately one-fourth of the senators and one-third of the representatives it would have had if the Ghetto had elected a percentage
of the county's legislators equal to its percentage of the county's
population.39 As a result, Ghetto residents who were sufficient in
number to control at least one-and probably more-single-member
district were not able to exercise a proportionate degree of control
in the Marion County multimember district.
Thus, because interest groups, and not individuals, are the real
electors of representatives, and because multimember districts may
dilute interest group voting strength, multimember districts are
considerably more likely to thwart effective representation than are
small, more homogeneous single-member districts.40
37. It is crucial to recognize the tendency for strong political-patty control over
nomination procedures. A political party will realize that in large districts only one
patty will prevail at any given election, and thus will select a slate of candidates which
will appeal to "majority interests." As a result, individuals seeking to represent minority
groups residing in large multimember districts may not even succeed in placing their
names on the ballot.
38. 305 F. Supp. at 1381-85.
39. 305 F. Supp. at 1384-85.
40. For a thorough treatment of the concept of effective representation, see Irwin,
Representation and Election: The Reapportionment Cases in Retrospect, 67 MICH. L.
R.Ev. 729 (1969), in which the author argnes that the problems of effective representa•
tion present essentially political questions which are too complex for judicial resolution.
See also Eulau, Wahlke, Buchanan & Ferguson, The Role of the Representative: Some
Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmond Burke, 53 AM. PoL. Ser. R.Ev. 742,
742-49 (1959); J. WAHLKE, W. BUCHANAN & L. FERGUSON, THE LEGISLATIVE SYSfEM: EX·
PLORATIONS IN LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR (1962); Kornberg, Perception and Constituency
Influence on Legislative Behavior, 19 WEsrERN POL. Q. 285 (1966); Wahlke, Buchanan,
Eulau & Ferguson, American State Legislators' Role Orientations Toward Pressure
Groups, 22 J. PoL. 203 (1960).
Despite the complexity of the concept of effective representation, voting power plays
a major role in representative democracy. Therefore, voting strength can serve important functions by providing a wedge for opening channels of communication between
voters and representatives--a function of particular value to often ignored minority
groups-and by providing a vehicle for interest-group approval or disapproval of legislative behavior. Conversely, an interest group's lack of voting strength is likely to cmas•
culatc that group and thus cause elected representatives to become unresponsive to its
needs.
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B. The Equal Protection Clause and
Effective Representation
Once it is established that subdistricting of multimember districts
can achieve more effective representation for a greater number of
interest groups, it must be determined whether the failure to subdistrict violates the equal protection clause. The court in Chavis did
not clearly articulate the legal basis for its conclusion that a multimember-districting scheme resulting in the minimization of the
voting strength of an interest group deprives the members of that
interest group of their right to equal protection. It is clear, however,
that the court neither invoked traditional equal protection standards,
nor relied upon the reasoning of the reapportionment cases that
state representatives must be elected by substantially equal numbers
of voters.41
The traditional test for determining whether a state has denied
an individual equal protection under the law has been whether a
statutory classification "can be deemed to be founded on some
rational and otherwise constitutionally permissible state policy."42
Under this test the complainant asserting a denial of equal protection has the burden of showing that the applicable statutory classification has no reasonable basis and is purely arbitrary and capricious.43 In a case like Chavis the state may be able to point to several
permissible state policies which rationally justify multimember districting. For example, multimember districts may facilitate compliance with one man-one vote standards, and may prevent gerry41. None of the plaintiffs complained that impermissible population variations
existed between the Marion County district and other districts in the state. See note 17
supra. Nonetheless, the district court"s relief included a redistricting of the entire state
as to both houses of the Geeneral Assembly. See text accompanying notes 104-11 infra.
42. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 681 (1966) (Justice
Harlan, dissenting).
43. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911), contains a
classic formulation of the requirements of the equal protection clause:
1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from
the State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the
exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only
when it is without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A
classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely
because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in
some inequality. 3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if
any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence
of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. 4. One
who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that
it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.
Clearly, multimember districts may be founded on the basis of some permissible state
policy.
See the discussion on the merits and problems of multimember districts at note 36
supra, and text accompanying note 44 infra. While multimember districts are actually
being established, the policy reasons for their establishment are surely not irrationaldisputable as they may be among the political scientists.
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mandering.H However, the reapportionment cases established the
principle that restrictions on the franchise require close judicial
scrutiny,45 and more recent cases have extended that principle by
holding that such restrictions cannot be upheld unless they are necessary to the achievement of a compelling state interest.46
It is unlikely that multimember districts which minimize the
voting strength of an identifiable element of the voting population
could meet the Court's hybrid rationality test. 47 The policy arguments which are traditionally set forth to justify such districts are
presently subject to much dispute48 and seem to be far outweighed by
the disadvantages inherent in the establishment of multimember
districts. The principal objection to multimember districts is based
on their tendency to deprive minority groups of effective representation. Since the goal of both the one man-one vote rule and the
Chavis holding is to promote "fair and effective representation," 49
it would seem to be irrational to justify a denial of effective representation to a minority group by a strict adherence to equal-population formulas. Moreover, the fact that other states have satisfied the
one man-one vote standard without resorting to multimember districts indicates that such districting is not necessary to the achievement of the compelling state interest involved-equal-population
districting. It would appear, therefore, that multimember districts
which dilute the voting strength of an identifiable element of the
44. See note 47 infra.
45. " .•• any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully
and meticulously scrutinized.'' Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). See also
Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
46. In Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969), the Court held
that " •.• if a challenged state statute grants the right to vote to some bona fide resi•
dents of requisite age and citizenship and denies the franchise to others, the Court
must determined whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state
interest." See also Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 704 (1969).
47. The Supreme Court in Reynolds mentioned the use of multimember districts:
"One body could be composed of single-member districts while the other could have at
least some multimember districts.'' 377 U.S. at 577. This statement was made to rebut
the argument that Reynolds had destroyed the utility of the concept of bicameralism.
But in Lucas v. Fourty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 731 n.21 (1964), the Court,
in referring to large multimember districts, said "we merely point out that there are
certain aspects of electing legislators at large from a county as a whole that might well
make the adoption of such a scheme undesirable to many voters residing in multimember counties.'' Two desirable aspects of multimember districts which might be
considered compelling state interests are the prevention of gerrymandering and the
facilitation of "home rule" plans or implementation of legislative programs. While
gerrymandering may be alleviated through large multimember districts, there is no net
gain if large interest groups are left with no voting strength. And the facilitation of
legislative programming has small significance if many voters have no voice in estab•
lishing those programs.
48. See note 36 supra.
49. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964). See also Chavis v. Whitcomb, 305 F.
Supp. 1364, 1386 (S.D. Ind. 1969) (responsive and effective representation).
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voting population cannot be justified within the Court's definition
of rationality.
However, while it may be appropriate to define effective representation in terms of interest-group political action, the Supreme
Court has not yet squarely adopted that position. Since its decision
in Baker v. Carr, rm the Court has condemned progressively smaller
deviations in population among both state legislative and congressional districts.111 As one commentator has argued, this obsession with
absolute population equivalency is based upon the fallacious equation of equal population with equal representation.52 If the Supreme
Court has, in fact, concluded that equal population is to be equated
with equal representation, then the plaintiff in Chavis arguably
failed to state a cause of action, because there were no alleged devia50. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
51. In Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 529-30 (1969), the Court invalidated
a districting plan which created congressional districts which varied from the ideal
figure, based on 1960 census figures, by 12,260 (2.84%) below to 13,542 (3.13%) above.
The Court rejected Missouri's argument that there was a fixed numerical or percentage
population variance small enough to be considered de minimis and to satisfy the
"as nearly as practicable" standard. The whole thrust of the "as nearly as practicable"
approach is inconsistent with adoption of fixed numerical standards which excuse
population variances without regard to the circumstances of each particular case. 394
U.S. at 530.
In Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969), the Court applied these principles in
invalidating New York's 1968 congressional districting statute, which treated seven
sections of the state as homogeneous regions and divided each of these regions into
districts of virtually identical population. Thirty-one of the forty-one districts were
constructed in such a manner, while the remaining ten were composed of groupings
of whole counties. The most populous district had more than 26,000 (6.488%) above
the mean population while the smallest district had over 27,000 (6.608%) below the
mean. 394 U.S. at 545.
Although these cases dealt with congressional districts, there is no reason to believe
that the same principles are not applicable to state legislative districts, since the Court
has referred to the two types of districts interchangeably. Dixon, Warren Court Crusade for the Holy Grail of "One Man-One Vote", 1969 SUP. Cr. REv. 219, 222.
52. "The Court fallaciously equated 'equal-population' districting with 'equal
representation.'" Dixon, supra note 51, at 228. Professor Dixon distinguishes the
concepts of equal representation and equal population:
Functionally, however, there is no such thing as "equal representation" in a
district system of electing legislators. There may be "equal population" districts,
which is an objectively verifiable concept. But with a district basis there can never
be "equal representation" because all districting discriminates by discounting
utterly the votes of the minority voters. This is the well-known, simple plurality
rule and it operates district by district as a winner-take-all rule. In this precise
sense all districting is gerrymandering, both in single member districting and in
multimember districting, although the effect is more dramatic in the latter instance.
Id. at 227.
Dixon also argues that equal representation would be possible only under a system
of proportional representation:
A goal of "equal representation" can be approximated only through abolishing
districts and using proportional representation, such as • • • some version of the
Hare system. Such proportionalization, whereby all the votes cast in the area
covered by the legislature are pooled and contending groups achieve legislative
representation closely proportional to their total popular vote, does represent
voters equally in proportion to their numbers. In short, "equal representation" is
generically a proportional representation concept. Id. at 228.
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tions in population among Indiana's legislative districts. But, as the
plaintiff in Chavis also demonstrated, equal population cannot be
equated with equal representation, and the Court's language in
Fortson suggests that the Court may be willing to recognize this
distinction.1m Furthermore, that language is consistent with the
Court's decisions striking down population deviations among districts. It would seem possible that by using computers and other
data-gathering aids, state legislative districts could be drawn which
have absolutely equal populations and which also do not minimize
the voting strength of an identifiable element of the voting population. 54 Hence, multimember districting should not be presumed
to be necessary to the enforcement of the one man-one vote rule. 1515
In appears, therefore, that multimember districts which dilute
the voting strength of cognizable interest groups cannot be justified
under the equal protection clause, within the Supreme Court's expressed conceptions of equal and effective representation. It must
be realized, however, that litigation problems in this area could be
quite complex, since the issues involved are considerably more subtle than merely applying the one man-one vote test. It is, therefore,
useful to set out the elements of a cause of action alleging infringement of the right to effective representation through multimember
districting.
IV.

MULTIMEMBER DISTRICTS AND EQUAL PROTECTION:
THE PRIMA FACIE CAsE

A Identification of the "Racial or Political Element"
In order to state a good cause of action in an effective-representation case, the plaintiff must first show that he is a member of a
cognizable racial or political interest group. 56
53. See text accompanying notes 6-8 supra.
54. See Dixon, supra note 51, at 251-53.
55. In a typical reapportionment case, once the plaintiff proves that population
variations exist among legislative districts, the state bears the burden of showing that
such discrepancies are necessary to the achievement of a compelling state interest. See
note 46 supra. It is clear from the language in Fortson and Reynolds, however, that
the state does not bear the burden of justifying the existence of a multimember
district. The state need not assume that burden until the plaintiff has satisfactorily
demonstrated that his vote has been diluted through the minimization of the voting
strength of his racial or political interest group.
The different allocations of the burden of proof in these two types of cases are
easily reconcilable. In one man-one vote cases, deviation from the arithmetic equality
among districts amounts to a per se dilution of the right to vote. But according to
Fortson and Bums, a resident of a multimember district does not make out a prima
facie case simply by proving the existence of that multimember district; he must also
prove that his vote has actually been diluted through minimization or cancellation
of his particular racial or political element's voting strength.
56. "The first requirement implicit in Fortson v. Dorsey and Burns v. Richardson,
that of an identifiable racial or political element within the multi-member district,
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Thus, in Chavis, the plaintiff sought to establish that the Negro
residents of the Center Township Ghetto constituted an identifiable
racial element. 57 Based on the evidence presented, the court concluded that the salaries, housing, educational level, welfare statistics,
and unemployment rate of the residents of certain proximately located census tracts in Center Township brought those tracts within
the scope of the term "ghetto." 58 The court determined that because
of the vast socioeconomic differences between the Center Township
Ghetto and other parts of Marion County, the needs of the Ghetto
residents differed substantially from the needs of the residents in
the more affluent sections, and that the Ghetto residents had interests in areas of substantive law59 which were not shared by their
suburban counterparts. Thus, the court held the Ghetto residents
to be a cognizable racial element.
The court's reasoning in Chavis indicates that in order to constitute an identifiable racial or political element, an interest group
must be comprised of individuals who share more than an isolated
set of characteristics. The members of the group must share a common "life-style," including such factors as geographical proximity,
relative equality in economic wealth and social status, and religious,
ethnic, or racial ties. 60 Only if a group is sociologically homogeneous
can a court reasonably conclude that the members of the group
have sufficiently common interests in pervasive and well-defined
areas of substantive law-interests that distinguish the group from
other residents of a multimember district in terms of the group's
governmental needs. Therefore, a careful factual inquiry is necessary before a court can grant standing to members of any group in
multimember-district litigation, and no single common characteristic, such as religious affiliation or veteran status, should be considered determinative if members of the group have varying interests
in other areas. 61
is met by the Negro residents of the Center Township Ghetto." Chavis v. Whitcomb,
305 F. Supp. 1364, 1386 (S.D. Ind. 1969).

57. The Center Township Ghetto "does not represent the entire ghettoized portion
of Center Township but only the portion which is predominantly inhabited by Negroes
and which was alleged in the complaint." 305 F. Supp. at 1380-81. The approximate
1967 population of this area was 132,000 of which approximately 35,000 were white
and 97,000 nonwhite. Approximately 99.8% of the nonwhite population was Negro.
305 F. Supp. at 1380 n.11.
58. See note 19 supra.
59. See note 20 supra.
60. See generally G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DII.E?.™A: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND
MODERN DEMOCRACY (2d ed. 1962); C. SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN BLACK AND WHITE (1964);
and K. T AEUBER & A. T AEUBER, NEGROES IN CmES: REsmENTIAL SEGREGATION AND
NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE (1965).
61. Under some circumstances, race alone may be a sufficiently identifying characteristic. See notes 62-65 infra and accompanying text.
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Because the interpretation of socioeconomic data usually is an
intricate process, difficult questions will arise when a court undertakes to determine whether a particular interest group is sufficiently
identifiable to be given legal recognition for purposes of establishing a prima fade case in a challenge to the validity of a multimember district. This determination may be considerably simplified,
however, when the alleged interest group consists of the inhabitants
of a Negro urban ghetto. The continuing controversy over school
integration obviates the need for extensive proof that race is widely
recognized as an important differentiating characteristic among
Americans; and the social and economic homogeneity that is found
among urban Negro ghetto residents is well documented. 62 These
observations suggest that in cases in which Negroes reside in racially segregated communities, they will presumptively possess substantially common interests in pervasive areas of substantive law
which justify considering such communities as identifiable racial
elements for purposes of granting such Negroes standing in multim~mber-district litigation.63 This is particularly true in Southern
cities, where multimember districts are prevalent64 and where there
has been historic hostility to the full extension of voting rights to
Negroes. 65
The Fortson dictum, however, was not limited to the voting
problems of racial elements; it also covered political elements.66
While it is unclear to what extent the courts will be willing to grant
standing to political elements to challenge multimember-districting
schemes, the challenging party clearly would bear the burden of
demonstrating that a particular group of residents has sufficient
sociological homogeneity to be classified as an identifiable political
element meriting legal recognition. In order to sustain that burden,
the challenging party would be required to produce data which
62. See note 60 supra.
63. In Chavis, the fact that a particular census tract included Negro inhabitants
did not ensure that that tract was part of the Center Township Ghetto in light of
variances between the included ghetto tracts and other relatively middle-class tracts
inhabited by Negroes. 305 F. Supp. at 1379-80. Nevertheless, in the Southern states the
overwhelming significance of the racial factor may group together persons of somewhat
varying economic and social status. The potentially expansive interests of Southern
Negroes in the civil rights area and the historic treatment of the Negro in the South,
coupled with the social mores of Negroes vis-a-vis whites generally, may sufficiently
identify that racial element as a readily cognizable minority interest group.
64. See note 2 supra. Southern rural areas are typically not racially segregated.
See, e.g., Kilgarlin v. Martin, 252 F. Supp. 404 (S.D. Tex. 1966), revd. on other grounds
sub nom., Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967) (Dallas); D~rsey v. Fortson, 228 F. Supp.
259 (N.D. Ga. 1964), revd., 379 U.S. 433 (1965) (Atlanta).
65. See, e.g., Smith v. Allright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461
(1953); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Sims v. Baggett, 247 F. Supp. 96
(M.D. Ala. 1965).
66. 379 U.S. at 439.
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demonstrates socioeconomic similarities among a substantial group
of individuals. Although this normally would be a formidable task
in a nonracial context, it is conceivable that certain racially heterogeneous suburban, 67 urban, or rural groups could be isolated as
distinct political elements as well within the meaning of the relevant
language in Chavis. There are, however, problems with this argument. Such groups-unlike Negroes living in urban ghettos or rural
pockets-are likely to be highly variegated in terms of the social
and economic status of their members. 68 As a result, parties who
allege that they are a part of a cognizable political element will not
have a distinguishing characteristic as obvious or as significant as
race, nor an isolated residential setting like a ghetto, from which
the conclusion of socioeconomic homogeneity may be rather easily
dravm. In order to prove the existence of an interest group which
shares a common life-style, these parties will have to point to factors
such as the relative permanence of the group within the area, the
income and educational levels of group members, their job status,
and their religious or ethnic affiliation. In light of the degree of
social diversity which characterizes most communities, it seems
doubtful that many groups sufficiently homogeneous to constitute
nonracial political elements will develop. 69
67. Suburbs can be defined as "those urbanized, residential communities which are
outside the corporate limits of a large central city, but which are culturally and economically dependent upon the central city.'' THE SUBURBAN COMMUNITY xvii (YI. Dobriner
ed. 1958). In a complex study, 0, WILLIAMS, H. HERMAN, C. LIEBMAN 8: T. DYE,
SUBURBAN DIFFERENCES .AND METROPOLITAN POLICIES (1965) [hereinafter WILLIAMS)
examine various suburban areas and conclude "that differentiation and specialization
in metropolitan areas results not only in interdependence among local units of government ••• but also in divergent local interests and policies that perpetuate demands for
autonomy.'' Id. at 289. Although this study indicates that suburban attitudes often
favor some form of metropolitan government, nonetheless, it points out the fact that
suburbs include many elements with varying attitudes toward governmental policy.
In at least one case plaintiffs have attempted to identify a suburban or rural group
as a cognizable interest group. See Kruidenier v. McCulloch, 258 Iowa 1121, 142 N.W.2d
355 (1966), in which various plaintiffs alleged that they belonged to a "rural minority,"
a suburban "community of interests," and the minority Republican party. The opinion
of the court does not mention these allegations, and relief was granted on other grounds
than the Fortson dictum (see note 12 supra). These allegations are discussed in DIXON,
supra note 1, at 481-83.
68. See note 35 supra for a discussion of the general notion that legislative districts
consist of a variety of different interests. Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law,
1962 SUP. Cr, R.Ev. 252, 273, points out that "even in the cities there are voters who
approve of legislative frugality, who dislike freeways or who believe that urban redevelopment should be left to private initiative.'' For a study of how suburban groups
may differ among themselves with respect to social and economic class and views on
policy questions, see WILLIAMS, supra note 67, at 35-37, 211-38.
69. Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases, 1964 SUP, Cr. R.Ev. 1, 38, stated that
even in the small towns and villages there are voters who approve of public spending, who like freeways, and who believe that public initiative is essential to
make our cities habitable. The welcome truth is that the members of no "interest"
group have identical views about how to promote the group's welfare.
A determination of the special interests of any of these "political elements" in particular areas of substantive law does not simplify the test of identifiability.
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The Fortson dictum's use of the term "political element" raises
the question whether political parties are sufficiently identifiable so
that their members may be granted standing to allege a denial of
effective representation as a result of a multimember-districting
scheme.70 Surely, the mere use of the term "political element" does
not compel a per se conclusion that political parties are legally
cognizable interest groups. Moreover, under the Chavis test, a political party would seldom, if ever, qualify as an identifiable political
element, because members of a political party normally come from
different backgrounds and represent varying interests; they seldom
share a common life-style.71 Therefore, while common political affiliation may provide one piece of evidence to support a conclusion
that a group of individuals shares a common life-style, this factor
alone falls short of establishing identifiability within the meaning
of the Chavis decision.
Once an interest group produces sufficient evidence for a court
to conclude that that group is identifiable, it may also have to prove
that it is large enough to merit legal recognition. Obviously, a handful of people living in a district containing thousands of voters
cannot reasonably assert that they have a right to elect a legislative
representative. While the issue of the size of the group will normally turn on the facts of a particular case, it is fair to say that when
the members of an interest group number more than fifty per cent
of the average population of single-member districts within the
70. See generally DIXON, supra note 1, at 485-99. For a discussion of the objectives
and tactics of political gerrymandering, see A. DEGRAZIA, APPORTIONMENT AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 156 (1963).
While the Supreme Court has treated questions arising from racial gerrymandering
as justiciable (Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960)), several courts have refused
to entertain challenges involving political gerrymandering. See, e.g., Sincock v. Gately,
262 F. Supp. 739 (D. Del. 1967); Meeks v. Avery, 251 F. Supp. 245 (D. Kan. 1966);
Bush v. Martin, 251 F. Supp. 484 (S.D. Tex. 1966); Jones v. Falcey, 48 N.J. 25, 222
A.2d 101 (1966); Newbald v. Osser, 425 Pa. 478, 230 A.2d 54 (1967). These courts have
relied on two recent Supreme Court cases: Badgely v. Hare, 385 U.S. 114 (1966), and
WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 382 U.S. 4 (1965). In Badgely, the Court dismissed "for want
of a substantial federal question" appeals from the Michigan supreme court by
plaintiffs seeking relief on a gerrymandering claim. In W.MCA v. Lomenzo, the Court
aflinned in a per curiam opinion a district court's approval (238 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y.
1965)) of a reapportionment plan whiclI was contested, inter alia, on the basis of
partisan gerrymandering. In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Harlan asserted
that by affirming the district court decision, the Supreme Court necessarily was affirming
a holding that partisan gerrymandering is not subject to constitutional attack. 382
U.S. at 6. For an argument restricting the scope of these decisions, see DIXON, supra
note I, at 484-90.
71. See DIXON, supra note I, at 51-53. Another court has stated that
. • . [T]he Constitution does not prescribe a single approaclI or motivation for
the drawing of district lines, and hence the Constitution is not offended merely
because a partisan advantage is in view. Indeed, it would be difficult to separate
partisan interests from other interests, since partisan interests may well be but
a summation of such other interests.
Jones v. Falcey, 48 N.J. 25, 32-33, 222 A.2d 101, 105 (1966) (emphasis added).
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state,72 the multimember scheme could effectively dilute that group's
voting strength. Of course, a single-member district could also be
drawn to splinter the interest group; but such action, if done deliberately, would amount to a violation of the fifteenth amendment.73 On the other hand, random drawing of single-member
districts would be unlikely to decimate the voting strength of such
a group, and the gerrymandering problem would be avoided if the
legislature made some effort to draw the districts along rational
interest-group lines.
Because of the uncertainties involved in attempting to determine
what size groups should be protected in a given multimember district, it is arguable that no strict numerical test can or should be
developed. Yet some consideration of group size is imperative for
obvious practical reasons, and would be aided by sociological and
demographic analysis of the voting power of groups of different
sizes in single- and multimember districts. One difficulty with a
numerical test is that a legislature could circumvent any such test
simply by decreasing the number of districts, thereby simultaneously
increasing the number of voters in each single-member district.
Such action would have the dual deleterious effect of diluting the
voting strength of interest groups within single-member districts74
and increasing the size required of an interest group before its
members could be granted standing to challenge the validity of a
multimember district. These objections to a numerical test, however,
are not completely convincing. First, it is unlikely that state legislators would vote to decrease the number of districts since in so
doing they might effectively vote themselves out of a job. In addition, with an ever-increasing population, there appears to be a need
for more, not fewer, representatives to meet the increasing workload.75 Finally, the fact that a numerical test would frustrate some
72. If no single-member districts exist within the state, essentially the same result
could be reached by taking 50% of the total state population and dividing that figure
by the total number of legislators in the legislative body involved in the suit.
73. See Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S.
339 (1960).
74. This raises the issue of whether very large single-member districts which
prevent substantial interest groups from electing representatives are constitutionally
infirm. See Justice Harlan's concurring opinion to the Court's summary per curiam
affirmance in WMCA v. Lomenzo, in which he asserted that discriminatory singlemember districting is not subject to fourteenth amendment attack. 382 U.S. at 5-6.
See also DrxoN, supra note I, at 484-90. Of course, fifteenth amendment challenges on
the basis of racial discrimination would be justiciable.
75. See Grad, The State Constitution: Its Function and Form for Our Time, 54
VA. L. REv. 928, 977 (1968). It is by no means a unanimously held view that more
legislative representatives are needed. See NATL. MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE
CoNsrITUTION 44 (6th ed. rev. 1968); Wirt, The Legislature, in NATL, MUNICIPAL
LEAGUE, SALIENT lssUES OF CoNsrrrUTIONAL REvISION 68, 74 ij. Wheeler ed. 1961).
Moreover, in a state with a growing population, the size of single-member districts
will increase merely by stabilizing the size of the legislative house, as is done with the
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legitimate interests does not necessarily militate against the use of
such a test.
It is submitted, therefore, that some form of numerical test should
be required. If a numerical test were not required, the courts might
be invaded with a large number of spurious suits. Furthermore, the
process of redistricting is costly both in terms of time and of money.
Thus, suits alleging a denial of effective representatives should not
be readily maintainable unless the voting rights of members of ascertainable groups are clearly being diluted. While there may be
some degree of arbitrariness in the use of the single-member district
as the basis for the test, the size of these districts is determined on a
rational basis since virtually all states have redistricted in the past
eight years in order to conform to Supreme Court apportionment
standards.
B. Proving Minimization of the Interest Group's
Voting Strength

In addition to proving the existence of a legally cognizable interest group, a plaintiff who is challenging the validity of a_multimember district must prove the minimization or cancellation of
the voting strength of that group by the multimember district. The
court's analysis in Chavis of the plaintiff's allegations of minimization of voting strength in that case indicates that the party claiming
minimization must sustain a heavy factual burden in order to prove
his case. Plaintiffs in pre-Chavis cases tended either to predict the
possible effects of the multimember district before any elections
actually had been conducted, or to analyze superficially the effects
of a multimember district in past elections without amassing evidence which tangibly demonstrated minimization.76 These preChavis attempts to invoke. the Fortson dictum were unsuccessful,
most often because the plaintiffs did not meet the Supreme Court's
requirement in Burns v. Richardson11 that "the demonstration that
a particular multimember scheme effects an invidious result must
appear from evidence in the record." 78
The plaintiff in Chavis, however, did present abundant evidence
which demonstrated the adverse effects of the multimember scheme
on the effective representation of Ghetto residents. 79 The first crucial fact was the residency pattern of elected legislators within
Marion County from 1960 to 1969. Although legislators "consisUnited States House of Representatives. Thus, interest groups in states experencing
population expansion may find it increasingly difficult to prove that they are large
enough to merit legal recognition.
76. See cases cited in note 12 supra.
77. 384 U.S. 73 (1966).
78. 384 U.S. at 88.
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tently resided in Washington Township in numbers far disproportionately [sic] to Washington Township's percentage of the population
of Marion County,'' 80 a disproportionately small number of legislators resided in the Center Township Ghetto.81 The court observed
that "[t]he Negro Center Township Ghetto population [was] sufficient in size to elect approximately two members of the House of
Representatives and approximately one senator if these were specific
single-member legislative districts within Marion County." 82 However, under the multimember system, the Ghetto was able to elect
only one-fourth of the senators and one-third of the representatives
to which its proportionate share of the county's population would
have entitled it to elect under a single-member-districting scheme.83
In addition, the plaintiff introduced evidence to prove, and the
court in Chavis found, that because the political parties controlled
the nominating machinery, legislators elected from Marion County
were reluctant to express the interests of the Ghetto residents in
the state legislature.84 The court discussed both past election results and the post-election behavior of legislators. Hence, it might
be argued that Chavis stands for the proposition that a court can
hold that an identifiable racial or political group is denied its legal
right of effective representation only if, in addition to showing that
the voting strength of that group is minimized or cancelled by the
multimember districts, the plaintiffs also prove that the representatives elected have failed to respond to the group's wishes and
needs.
This interpretation of the Chavis opinion, however, is not compelled by the language of the decision, since the complexity of
the opinion itself illustrates that any inquiry into the question
whether representatives are "responsive" to the needs of an interest
group is at best subjective, qualitative, and uncertain. 85 Moreover,
79. The Chavis court took pains to distinguish the facts in that case from those
presented to the Supreme Court in Fortson:
We further note that under Burns v. Richardson, at p. 88, invidious discrimination resulting from a multi-member districting scheme can be more easily shown
if certain circumstances, which were not present in Fortson v. Dorsey, obtain.
This case presents each of those circumstances, leading to the legal conclusions
here stated.
!105 F. Supp. at 1386.
80. !105 F. Supp. at 1381.
81. !105 F. Supp. at 1385.
82. !105 F. Supp. at 1385.
8!!. 305 F. Supp. at 1384. See also tables at 1381-85 which demonstrate population
relationships among various townships and subdivisions of townships in Marion County
and the number of legislators who resided in those areas in the years 1960-69.
84. 305 F. Supp. at 1386.
85. Proof of party control and subsequent legislative behavior may have been used
by the Chavis court for several reasons. First, the court may have considered these
factors as unessential but useful pieces of evidence demonstrating that plaintiffs had
been denied effective representation. Second, the court may have used evidence of
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the Fortson dictum discussed only the minimization or cancellation
of the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting
population,86 and not the relevance of the legislature's responsiveness to such elements. Therefore, a group seeking to prove that it
has been denied effective representation should not be required to
demonstrate as part of its prima facie case that the representatives
who are elected from the multimember district are "unresponsive"
to the group's wishes and needs.
Of course, the mere fact that an interest group is not able to
elect exactly a proportionate number of legislators in every election
does not necessarily support the conclusion that the voting strength
of that group has been minimized. The enormous number' of variables associated with the electoral process makes some random deviation from absolute proportionality inevitable. Nevertheless, gross
disproportions existing over long periods of time, such as those
described in Chavis,81 cannot reasonably be attributed to chance, and
hence should be viewed as strong evidence that the minority interest
group involved has been denied effective representation.
C.

The Irrelevance of Intent in Proving Minimization
of Voting Strength

Even though a plaintiff may successfully demonstrate the minimization or cancellation of the voting strength of a legally cognizable interest group, the defendant may urge that the plaintiff is not
entitled to relief until he also proves that the state intended to
minimize or cancel the group's voting strength through the use of
a multimember district. The Supreme Court in Fortson left the
question of the need to prove intent open when it suggested that
"designedly or othenvise" a multimember-districting scheme might
operate to cancel out the voting strength of some racial or political
element.88 In Chavis, the district court summarily rejected the relevance of legislative intent by emphasizing the term "otherwise" in
the Fortson Court's language.89 • Other federal courts, however, have
suggested that on the basis of Wright v. Rockefeller,00 proof of legparty control to illustrate the fact that Ghetto voters could not elect Ghetto residents
to represent them. Finally, the evidence may have served to rebut the argument that
legislators elected from multimember districts represent all residents of a district,
rather than just particular groups. These alternative interpretations suggest that a
plaintiff's failure to prove party control and legislative unresponsiveness would not,
and should not, be fatal to the establishment of a prima fade case.
86. See note 8 supra and accompanying text. See also note 40 supra.
87. See note 80 supra.
88. 379 U.S. at 439.
89. "It is largely beyond concern whether this effect occurs 'designedly or otherwise.'" 305 F. Supp. at 1370.
90. 376 U.S. 52 (1964). It should be noted that Wright was decided before the
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islative intent to minimize interest group voting strength is essential
to a successful challenge to the validity of a multimember district.91
In Wright, the plaintiffs attempted to prove that the New York
legislature, in establishing congressional districts, segregated the
voters in Manhattan by virtue of race and place of origin.92 The
plaintiffs alleged that the legislature intentionally fenced Negroes
and Puerto Ricans out of a predominantly white upper-middle-class
district and into three other districts, thereby diminishing their
effectiveness as a minority-group voting bloc since they were unable
to elect a representative in the all-white district.93 The plaintiffs
asked the court to infer discriminatory intent on the part of the
legislature in establishing the four Manhattan congressional districts
from the fact that three of the districts were drawn to include the
overwhelming number of Negro and Puerto Rican citizens in
the county of New York, whereas the fourth district was populated
by only a minute percentage of Negroes or Puerto Ricans. 94 In adSupreme Court laid down the one man-one vote test in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533 (1964).
91. In Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967), plaintiffs attacked the validity of the
1965 Texas Apportionment Statute, TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 195(a) (1969) on
several grounds, one of which was that the apportionment of Texas into single-member,
multimember, and fioterial districts, rather than into single-member districts only,
constituted arbitrary and capricious gerrymandering. The district court stated that
"(p]laintiffs contend that •.• [this districting plan] 'constitutes a scheme designed to
minimize or cancel out the voting strengh of racial and political elements (i.e., the
Republican Party, liberal Democrats, and the Negro race) within said districts.' They
[the plaintiffs] claim that the combination plan results in a constitutionally proscribed
political and racial gerrymandering." 252 F. Supp. at 432. The court considered of
crucial importance the absence of any evidence of legislative discriminatory intent:
"No witness testified that racial considerations motivated the Legislature when it
drew the district lines • • • , and the Court will not infer the existence of such a
sinister motive in the action of the Legislature without clear proof thereof." 252 F.
Supp. at 437.
Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion of the Supreme Court's reversal of the
district court in Kilgarlin on other grounds, stated that he reserved the question of
effective Negro disenfranchisement through multimember districting until the case
is once again brought before the district court. 386 U.S. at 126.
In Sims v. Baggett, 247 F. Supp. 96 (M.D. Ala. 1965), the court, in finding intent
by the Alabama Legislature to gerrymander racially, pointed out: "Strong inferences
can be drawn from the reapportionment of some of the Senate districts of a legislative
purpose to prevent the election of Negroes to membership in the State Senate." 247
F. Supp. at 106.
92. 376 U.S. at 53.
93. 211 F. Supp. 460, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
94. The view that racially drawn districts per se would also violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment finds support in the per curiam
decisions of the Supreme Court following Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,
347 U.S. 483 (1954). These cases outlawed racial segregation in public parks,
beaches, buses, and golf courses without any discussion of harm resulting from
discrimination in the use of those facilities.
Opinion of Judge Feinberg, in Wright v. Rockefeller, 211 F. Supp. at 468-69. See also
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), in which the Supreme Court noted that the
s~da!<l: tradi~o~y aJ?plied in equal prote~on cases, whi<;h prohibits only arbitrary
or mv1dious discrimmation and grants the legislature the widest discretion in making
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dition, the plaintiffs introduced evidence showing irregularities in
the boundary lines themselves. 95
In denying relief to the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court accepted
the conclusion of the divided three-judge district court "that [plaintiffs] failed to prove the New York Legislature was either motivated
by racial considerations or in fact drew the distinctions on racial
lines." 96
Based on this language in Wright, lower federal courts in cases
involving challenges to the validity of multimember schemes have
sometimes included the factor of legislative intent as a required
element in a cause of action alleging infringement of a minority
interest group's right to effective representation. 97 However, the
fact that a finding of legislative intent may be required in cases
alleging actual racial segregation or racially discriminatory districting98 does not necessarily compel the conclusion that such a finding
is essential to a successful challenge to a multimember-districting
scheme. While Wright specifically dealt with alleged racial discrimination, such allegations are not essential in a multimember-districting case. 99 As in the reapportionment cases, the crucial consideration
in multimember-districting cases is whether the districting scheme
involved has the effect of diluting the votes of one class of individuals
as compared to the votes of other residents of the state.100 Once a
plaintiff demonstrates that a legally cognizable interest group, of
which he is a member, has had its voting strength minimized by
classifications, is not applicable to racial classifications because the strong policy embodied in the fourteenth amendment of eliminating racial classification renders racial
discrimination constitutionally suspect. Therefore necessity, and not mere rationality,
is the controlling test in cases involving racial classifications. 379 U.S. at 196.
95. 211 F. Supp. at 469-71, 474.
96. 376 U.S. at 56. The Court agreed with the three-judge district court that plaintiffs' evidence allegedly proving a prima fade case of legislative intent to segregate
inferred an equally or even more persuasive finding to the contrary. Justices Goldberg
and Douglas dissented. For a thorough analysis of burden of proof problems, see
Note, Wright v. Rockefeller and Legislative Gerrymanders: The Desegregation Decisions
Plus a Problem of Proof, 72 YALE L.J. 1041 (1963).
97. See cases cited in note 91 supra.
98. In Gomillion
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), plaintiffs alleged that a local
ordinance altered the shape of the city from a square to a twenty-eight-sided figure;
the effect of the ordinance was to remove from the city limits almost all of the city's
400 Negro voters. The Court ruled that on the basis of the alleged facts, the ordinance
constituted discrimination against Negro plaintiffs in violation of the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment and of the right to vote as
guaranteed by the fifteenth amendment-and that, therefore, those facts sufficiently
stated a cause of action. S64 U.S. at S46.
99. The plaintiff in Chavis did not allege that the multimember scheme abridged
his fifteenth amendment right to vote, probably because proof of legislative intent to
discriminate was not available, and because the boundary lines of the Marion County
District were not overly irregular as were the lines in Gomillion. See note 98 supra.
100. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).

v.
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the establishment of a multimember district, he has shown that his
right to vote has been diluted. Since the clear message of Reynolds
is that vote dilution violates the fourteenth amendment to the same
extent as invidious discriminations based on race,101 no showing of
actual legislative intent to abridge the franchise of certain interest
groups should be required when a showing of vote dilution is made
by a plaintiff.
Members of a racial minority group, therefore, should have alternative grounds for contesting the validity of a multimemberdistricting scheme: such plaintiffs may challenge a districting scheme
by showing either that the legislature intended to segregate on the
basis of race, or that an improper minimization of their interest
group's voting strength results from a districting scheme, regardless
of legislative intent. 102 The plaintiff in Chavis employed the second
alternative, and alluded to his race only insofar as it established
that he belonged to a cognizable racial element.103 His complaint
did not allege that district boundaries were drawn on the basis of
race; rather, it alleged that the multimember district resulted in
an invidious discrimination by diluting his right to vote. The plaintiff viewed the factor of legislative intent as irrelevant and therefore
unnecessary to his complaint.

V. THE

.APPROPRIATE Rfil.IEF

The district court in Chavis determined that the dilution of the
voting strength of residents of the Center Township Ghetto would
continue as long as Marion County remained a large multimember
district for purposes of electing members to the state Senate and
House of Representatives.104 The court also noted that "to redis101. 377 U.S. at 586.
102. It may be argued that these alternatives give black or other racial groups a
heads-we-win-tails-you-lose option-if a racial ghetto is crammed into one large singlemember district, its residents can base their claim on the ground of racial segregation;
but if the ghetto is split up among several small single-member districts or absorbed
by a large multimember district, the residents can argue their claim on the ground of
vote dilution. See text accompanying notes 114-15 infra.
103. 305 F. Supp. at 1373-81.
104. 305 F. Supp. at 1399.
While there are several variations of the multimember district, none of these variations would necessarily ensure effective representation. For example, as in Fortson, some
multimember districts have been subdistricted so that legislators reside in the various
subdistricts, but are elected at large. Some states have "negative residence" provisions
which require that one or more of the representatives from a multimember, multicounty district come from the smaller counties. Under rotation provisions, one or two
seats are rotated in each election so that some of the legislators in a multimember,
multicounty system will come from smaller counties. While these measures do alleviate the Chavis problem somewhat, the at-large voting provisions make it possible for
a majority of the population of a multimember district to prevent a minority interest
group from electing any candidates.
A final variant of multimember districts consists of "place" voting. Under this system,
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trict Marion County alone, to provide single-member or any other
type of districts meeting constitutional standards, would leave impermissible population variations between the new Marion County
districts and other districts in the State."105 In addition to those
variations that would exist between new Marion County districts
and other districts in the state, the court took judicial notice of
impermissible population variations which already existed among
districts in the state other than the Marion County multimember
district. The court therefore concluded that a redistricting of the
entire state for both houses of the General Assembly was necessary.106 However, the court initially withheld issuing an injunction
until the state legislature had time to enact statutes redistricting
Marion County and the rest of the state pursuant to the court's
opinion.107
Although the Governor and state legislature were allowed approximately two months-until October I, 1969-to redistrict the
state, the Governor failed to call a special session of the legislature
for the purpose of accomplishing that redistricting task. 108 Therewidely used in the South, all candidates in a multimember district designate the particular seats for which they are running. A candidate runs only against the others who
have designated the same seat, and all voters in the district vote for all seats. DIXON,
supra note 1, at 514-15. This system has the advantage of at least offering the voter
the opportunity to choose one candidate over another. However, it may be harmful
to Negro candidates because it spotlights them. Thus, the different variations of the
multimember monolith do not necessarily lead to the election of representatives who
are members of identifiable racial or political elements. See DIXON, supra note 1, at
512-15.
105. 305 F. Supp. at 1399.
106. 305 F. Supp. at 1399-400. The court cited Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 673 (1964):
[r]egardless of possible concessions made by the parties and the scope of the consideration of the courts below, in reviewing a state legislative apportionment case
this Court must of necessity consider the challenged scheme as a whole in determining whether the particular State's apportionment plan, in its entirety, meets federal constitutional requisites.
305 F. Supp. at 1391. Observing that the populations of the State of Indiana and of the
United States are highly mobile, and thus require occasional re-examination, the court
concluded that voting strength is a question not "easily accommodated by classical concepts of res judicata or of stare decisis." 305 F. Supp. at 1371. In light of changing
demographic patterns and the more refined one man-one vote standards developed since
Stout v. Bottorff, 249 F. Supp. 488 (S.D. Ind. 1965), the district court felt that redistricting of the entire state was warranted.
The court warned that it was in no way intimating that Negroes residing in the
Ghetto were entitled to a certain number of legislators to represent them as a
minority group: "Legislative districts are to be drawn with an eye that is color blind."
305 F. Supp. at 1391. But the court also emphasized that sophisticated gerrymandering
has been soundly condemned. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
107. 305 F. Supp. at 1400.
108. Chavis v. Whitcomb, 307 F. Supp. 1362 (S.D. Ind. 1969). On August 20, 1969,
Governor Whitcomb moved the court to stay proceedings. This motion, along with
a similar motion by intervening defendants who were joined by Governor Whitcomb,
was denied on September 4, 1969. The Governor did not call a special session of the
Indiana General Assembly for the purpose of redistricting the state as the court ha~
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fore, on October 15, 1969, the court invited various parties109 to
submit proposed redistricting plans to it. As minimal guidelines
to be followed by the parties in drawing up their proposals, the
court required that 1960 census data be used,11° that single-member
districts be preferred to multimember districts, and that county and
tmvnship boundary lines be followed in drawing proposed districts
whenever possible.
After considering the various plans presented to it, the district
court, on December 15, 1969, accepted the plaintiff's proposal and
delivered an order redistricting the state into one hundred singlemember house districts and fifty single-member senate districts. 111
The court found that the plaintiff's plan for redistricting Marion
County protected the minority interest group comprised of the
residents of the Center Township Ghetto against minimization of
voting strength, whereas the proposal submitted by the state combined, in several instances, suburban areas with portions of the
Center Township Ghetto,11 2 and thus failed to cure the defects in
the multimember-districting scheme which was held unconstitutional by the court.
In its redistricting order, the district court did not explain why
single-member districts were preferable to multimember districts,
except to observe that a scheme of single-member districts would be
more likely to assure the Ghetto minority group of some legislators
than would a scheme of multimember districts. Yet while the court
condemned racial gerrymandering, it did not consider that its plan
might tend to "crowd" Ghetto residents into districts, as New York
instructed him to do. 305 F. Supp. at 1400. Accordingly, the court concluded that it
would itself redistrict the state pursuant to its earlier opinion of July 28, 1969, which
appeared at 305 F. Supp. 1364. 307 F. Supp. at 1364.
109. The plaintiffs in Chavis, the Senate Legislative Apportionment Committee, and
the House and Senate majority and minority leaders, among others, eventually sub•
mitted plans to the court. 307 F. Supp. at 1365.
110. Objections were raised to the court's use of 1960 census figures in drawing
districts on the grounds that these statistics were so outdated that they could no longer
be regarded as credible. In response to these objections, the court cited Grills v.
Branigan, 284 F. Supp. 176, 180 (S.D. Ind. 1968): "[T]he Census of 1960 must be tolerated
until the next official census in order to maintain relative political stability." 307 F.
Supp. at 1365.
111. 307 F. Supp. at 1367. The state had appealed the district court's decision on
the merits to the United States Supreme Court. After the district court rendered its
December 15, 1969, order redistricting the state (307 F. Supp. at 1!!62), the state presented to Justice Marshall an emergency application for a stay of the district court's
judgment. Justice Marshall referred the application to the entire Supreme Court which
granted the stay on February 2, 1970. 396 U.S. 1055 (1970). On February 6, 1970, the
Court upheld the stay in a 7-1 decision, with Justice Douglas dissenting. 396 U.S. 1064
(1970). The state's appeal on the merits is still pending before the Court. Appeals
from the July 28, 1969, opinion (305 F. Supp. at 1364) and the December 15, 1969,
order (307 F. Supp. at 1363) have been consolidated into No. 1198. !!97 U.S. 984 (1970).
See note Ill supra for a summary of the consolidation of the various appeals.
112. !!07 F. Supp. at 1365.
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was alleged to have done in Wright v. Rockefeller.118 Although the
court's action in Chavis arguably could be attacked on the ground
that it amounted to outright racial gerrymandering, in that the new
districts were drawn specifically with a view to the Ghetto residents'
race, such a challenge would be difficult to sustain in light of the
requisite proof of the element of intent in a racial gerrymandering
case.114 Moreover, the plaintiff surely could not object to the operation of his own redistricting plan. Even assuming a new party to
the litigation were granted standing to challenge the court's plan
and that party cleared the legislative-intent hurdle, it could still be
asserted that the new plan was the only way in which the compelling
state interest in equal and effective representation could be implemented.115
VI.

CONCLUSION

The questions of determining the optimum size of districts and
the most equitable and practical boundary lines for districts may
well extend beyond judicial competence and into the sole purview
of legislative authority. Although it is highly unlikely that any state
legislature will ever answer those questions perfectly, legislatures
should not be deterred from attempting to redistrict in a manner
which promotes more effective representation for as many citizens
as possible. But when a certain threshold of representational inequity is reached and the state legislature does not provide a remedy,
then the courts must hear legitimate complaints and, in appropriate
cases, respond to those complaints by granting affirmative relief.
A Supreme Court affirmation of the district court's ruling in
Chavis would bring the concept of effective representation directly
into the mainstream of the reapportionment revolution. The representational inequities in the Marion County multimember district present a blatant example of the inability of mere population
equivalency between legislative districts to ensure effective representation. While the Supreme Court in Fortson and the district
court in Chavis did not clearly explain the relationship between
effective representation of interest groups and the equal protection
clause, the doctrinal basis for that relationship can be deduced when
113. 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
114. See notes 88-103 supra and accompanying text.
115. See notes 52 and 55 supra. The possible problem of crowding an interest group
into a single-member district-if such a problem exists in the constitutional sense-is
considerably less harmful than the problem of minimization which may arise in a
multimember-district situation. Although crowding may reduce the number of representatives which a particular interest group can elect by itself and in coalition with
other groups, minimization through multimember districting often deprives an interest group of any representation at all. Thus, subdistricting, such as that ordered in
Chavis, can provide a substantial interest group which is submerged in a large multimember district with at least some representation.
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the right to vote is viewed as a "fundamental right" guaranteed by
the equal protection clause, and the value of the individual vote
is recognized as dependent on the voting power of the interest
group to which the voter belongs.
By establishing strict standards for the identification of a racial
or political element and for the demonstration of minimization of
voting strength, courts will be reasonably able to determine whether
an interest group's vote is being diluted.116 Yet adherence to such
strict standards will not prevent courts and legislatures who are engaged in redistricting from conforming both to the one man-one
vote rules and to the more subtle requirements of effective representation.
116. Whatever theoretical problems are normally encountered when a court attempts to apply the tests for identifiability of an interest group, these problems may be
greatly minimized when the plaintiffs in a case are residents of an urban Negro ghetto,
as in the Chavis case. It can be readily demonstrated that Negro voters in many states
belong to groups that have interests which set those groups apart as identifiable racial
elements. When Negroes are submerged in large multimember districts, their voting
strength may be minimized, and thus they may be denied their right to effective representation.

